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but it does not give judges carte blanche to insist that a monopolist alter
its way of doing business
whenever some other approach might yield
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ABSTRACT

Pharmaceutical product hopping is a relatively new phenomenon in
which a brand-name pharmaceutical company tactically reformulates a
drug and patents the reformulation in an attempt to avoid competition by
a generic competitor. When viewed in the context of the HatchWaxman framework, product hopping can effectively eliminate generic
competitors from the market, thereby implicating § 2 of the Sherman
Act. In addressing antitrust liability, this Note advocates a per se legal
approach to product hopping so long as the hop is supported by a valid
patent. Although some have argued that deference to the United States
Patent and Trademark Office and the resultant presumption of validity
for issued patents is undeserved, such deference is necessary to ensure a
consistent approach to product hopping, to avoid type I errors that could
trigger a chilling effect on pharmaceutical innovation, and to prevent
additional litigation which would erode patent rights, diminish value,
and delay innovation.
I. INTRODUCTION

From hypertension to HIV/AIDS, cancer to cystic fibrosis,
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry has saved countless lives,
contributed to an increase in life expectancy, improved quality of life,
and resulted in fewer surgeries, hospital stays, and trips to the ER.3 Put
simply, innovative drug discovery "can mean an extra three months or
five months or a year-another [holiday] with the family, another season
to plant a garden, another passage in the life of a child."4 While the
societal value of such innovation is priceless, the cost of developing new
pharmaceuticals is enormous at more than $1 billion per drug.5 The risk
of failure is equally as high. Indeed, for every brand-name drug that
3. See PhRMA, The Value of Medicine: Facts and Figures 2006 (2005),
http://www.phnna.org/files/Value%20of20Medicine%202006.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2008)
(Recent findings by a Columbia University researcher indicate that new medicines generated 40
percent of the two-year gain in life expectancy achieved in 52 countries between 1986 and 2000.
Also, between 1980 and 2000, the number of days Americans spent in the hospital fell by 56
percent. As a result, Americans avoided 206 million days of hospital care in 2000 alone.).
4. Donna St. George, Time in a Bottle; A New Generation of Precision Cancer Drugs is
Seducing Patients with the Possibility of Adding Months, Even Years, to their Lives. If Only they
Could Get theirHands on Them, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2004, at WiO.
5. Although estimates differ, one source suggests that the cost of an approved
pharmaceutical drug, including average launch costs, has gone up from $1.1 billion in 1995-2000 to
$1.7 billion in 2000-2002. See Peter Landers, Cost of Developing a Drug Increases to About $1.7
Billion, WALL ST. J. at B4 (December 8, 2003);PAREXELS Pharmaceutical R&D Statistical
Sourcebook 2006/2007 107 (Parexel International Corporation 2006).
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makes it to market, 5,000 to 10,000 drug targets fail.6 Given the
incredible upfront investment and attendant risks, it is widely believed
that without the protection of patents, brand-name drug companies
7
would cease to invest in research and development of new drugs.
Despite the critical social benefits provided by pharmaceutical
innovation, there is a general consensus that prescription drugs are too8
expensive and that more generic alternatives are needed to reduce costs.
Some critics have even portrayed pharmaceutical companies as villains
raking in profits while average people cannot afford the drugs they need
to live. 9 In response to such criticism and in an attempt to reduce the
cost of prescription drugs, the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted in 1984
to "balance the benefits of patent protection for drug innovation against
the benefits of lower prices from generic competition."' 0 Despite its
noble intent, the Act's complex legislative framework, which governs
the interaction between brand-name and generic drug companies, has
lead to a culture of patent litigation." As a result, brand-name drug
companies, in an attempt to protect their patent rights, have been forced
exclusionary
to engage in exclusionary tactics, such as reverse
2
agreements, authorized generics, and product hopping.'
Pharmaceutical product hopping is a relatively new phenomenon
which occurs when a brand-name drug company tactically reformulates
a drug and patents the reformulation in an attempt to avoid competition
by a generic competitor. 3 While this tactic would be of little
consequence outside the Hatch-Waxman framework, inside the
framework, it can effectively eliminate generic competitors from the
market and, thus, implicates § 2 of the Sherman Act. 14 In addressing
liability under § 2, courts are once again faced with the onerous
6. ACCENTURE,

THE PURSUIT

OF

HIGH

PERFORMANCE THROUGH

RESEARCH

AND

DEVELOPMENT 24 (2007), http://www.phrma.org/files/Accenture%20R&D%20Report-2007.pdf.
[hereinafter Accenture Report].
7.

DAVID SCHWARTZMAN,

INNOVATION

IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL

INDUSTRY

167-

73(1976).
8. Andrew A. Phillips, Comment, Strengthening Pharmaceutical Patent Rights: Lowering
the Cost of Prescription Drugs By Stopping the Reckless Patent Litigation Abuse of Generic
Companies, 13 CONN. INS. L.J. 397, 399 (2006-2007).
9. Id.
10. Richard Gilbert, Holding Innovation to an Antitrust Standard, 3.1 COMPETITION POLICY
INT'L 68 (Spring 2007).
11. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006).
12. Alan Devlin, Exclusionary Strategies in the Hatch-Waxman Context, 2007 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 631, 632 (2007).
13. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2002).

14. Devlin, supra note 11, at 658.
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challenge of maintaining the delicate balance between patent and
antitrust law.
Under the antitrust laws, there are three possible standards under
which product hopping may be addressed: 1) per se illegal; 2) per se
legal; or 3) rule of reason. One author advances a convincing argument
that courts should first consider the timing of the product hop and then
deem the product hop per se legal if the old formulation is left on the
market, or apply the rule of reason if the old formulation is pulled off the
market.' 5 Under the rule of reason, the product hop would be deemed
per se illegal if the new formulation is not a significant improvement
over the previous formulation.1 6 This argument, while persuasive and
well supported, relies on the courts' ability "to distinguish non-existent
or trivial improvements, on the one hand, from significant quality
enhancements, on the other.' 17 Reliance on the courts to make this
determination is problematic because the patent laws already provide a
comprehensive regulatory framework for determining whether a product
improvement is sufficient for patent protection.' 8 This is of critical
concern in the pharmaceutical industry where innovation is frequently
and necessarily incremental and, to the lay judge or jury, may
erroneously appear to be no better than the existing technology.
Moreover, if product hopping becomes commonplace and ultimately
leads to a long-term reduction in generic alternatives, the issue should be
fixed at the statutory rather than the judicial level. For this reason,
courts should apply a per se legal approach to product hopping so long
as the new product is based on a valid patent. Under this approach,
courts should defer to the decision of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) in deciding the validity of an improvement
patent. Doing so will ensure a consistent approach, avoid the likelihood
of type I errors that could trigger a chilling effect on pharmaceutical
innovation, 9 and prevent additional litigation which heightens the
uncertainty of patent rights and ultimately diminishes value and delays
innovation.2 °
In advocating a per se legal approach to product hopping, it is
important to acknowledge the counterargument that deference to the

15. Id.at658-59.
16. Id. at 662.
17. Id. at 661-62.

18.
19.
practices
20.

35 U.S.C §§ 101, 102, 103 (1952).
Devlin, supra note 11, 641 n.55 (Type I errors occur when pro-competitive business
are struck down).
Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 203.
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USPTO and the resultant presumption of validity for issued patents is
undeserved. Indeed, some have argued that "rather than protecting
accurate initial decisions from inefficient later meddling . . . [the
presumption of validity] precludes what would often be a worthwhile
second look at patent validity." 2 1 While the USPTO is certainly
burdened with an ever-increasing workload, 22 patent examiners, rather
than judges and layperson juries, possess the technical expertise
necessary to properly assess the merits of a patent application.
Moreover, the presumption of validity does not prevent invalidation of
wrongly granted patents. While the challenger is faced with proving
invalidity via clear and convincing evidence,23 this stringent standard
provides the basis of strong patent rights essential to fueling innovation - especially in the pharmaceutical industry. The bottom line is that while
the USPTO's review process may, in some cases, be less than ideal, the
benefits far outweigh the disadvantages.
Part I of this Comment addresses the tension between the Sherman
and Patent Acts. The critical value of patents in the pharmaceutical
industry is explained and advocated. Part II outlines the framework of
the Hatch-Waxman Act and addresses the resultant culture of patent
litigation and the exclusionary tactic of product hopping. Part III
considers antitrust decision theory and suggests a product hop supported
by a valid patent on a new drug formulation, dosage, or format should be
deemed per se legal - - even if the product hop ultimately harms
consumers in the short-term by keeping a generic drug off the market.
The benefits of a per se legal approach versus the rule of reason are
discussed and the likely counterarguments addressed.
II. THE CONTENTIOUS INTERSECTION OF THE PATENT ACT AND
SHERMAN ACT

Patent rights are anchored in the Constitution and give Congress the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to . .. Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective ...Discoveries. 24 A patent grants an innovator "the right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling [an]

21. Doug Lichtman & Mark Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60
STANFORD L. REv. 45,48 (2007).
22. Statistics show that in 2007, the USPTO received 484,955 new patent applications. See
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/us-stat.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2008).
23. Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cit. 2000).
8.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
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invention" 25 for a period of 20 years from the date of application. 26 The
Patent system "reflects a balance between the need to encourage
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition
without any concomitant advance in the 'Progress of Science and useful
Arts."' 27 Thus, the "'embarrassment of an exclusive patent' is a special

legal privilege justified only
[when] .. . 'monopolies of invention' serve
28
society."'
of
'benefit
the
The goals of antitrust law, embodied in the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 et seq., mirror those of patent law. Specifically, the Sherman Act,
much like the Patent Act, strives to "stimulate competition and
innovation. 29 Despite these common goals, the two areas of law
function in stark contrast to one another. While the Patent Act grants a
limited monopoly, § 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits "monpoliz[ation], or
attempt[s] to monopolize, or combin[ations] or conspir[acies] . . . to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
states. 30 Indeed, "a patent by its very nature is anticompetitive" and "an
exception to the general rule
against monopolies and the right of access
31
to a free and open market."
Certainly, this "tension between restraints on anti-competitive
behavior imposed by the Sherman Act and grants of patent monopolies
under the [Patent Act]" 3 2 creates a nucleus of uncertainty in the
pharmaceutical market. Brand-name, or innovator, pharmaceutical
companies are faced with the impossible decision of either stringently
protecting their patent rights or risking their investments in innovation to
avoid antitrust litigation and treble damages. To fully appreciate the
quandary faced by innovator pharmaceutical companies, it is helpful to
first consider the unique role of patents in the pharmaceutical industry.

25. 35 U.S.C. §154(a)(1) (2000).
26. 35 U.S.C. §154 (2000).

27. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
28. Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating
the PatentPrivilege in HistoricalContext, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 954 (2007) (citing Letter from

Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
326, 334-35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903)).
29. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 201.
30. 15 U.S.C. §2 (2000).
31. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(petitionfor cert.filed) (U.S. Mar. 23, 2009) (No. 08-1194).
32. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 201.
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PatentProtectionand the Role ofPatents in the Pharmaceutical
Industry

In today's society, innovator pharmaceutical companies provide a
key facet of future health and well-being. For example, there are
presently more than 750 new medications in development for the
treatment of cancer,33 277 for the treatment of heart disease and stroke,34
92 for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, 35 and countless others. Despite their
significant societal contribution, pharmaceutical companies must fight to
protect their intellectual property rights. Patents are crucial and relied
upon heavily to protect the enormous upfront investment required to
bring a new drug to market. Of critical importance is the fact that,
unlike electronics or other high-tech goods, pharmaceuticals are easily
reverse engineered and, thus, easily copied and sold at considerably
lower prices by a competitor who did not incur research and
development costs. 36 Without patent protection, brand-name drug
companies would likely cease to invest in research and development as
they would be undercut in the market and fail to recoup their initial
costs. 37 Innovation would be stymied and society would suffer as the
pipeline of drugs to meet future healthcare needs would run dry. Put
simply, "the promise of the new biomedical sciences of the 21st century
- is by no means a sure thing... If the needed R&D investments can't be
covered or made less risky, they will slow down. 38
Several issues unique to drug development explain the
pharmaceutical industry's strong reliance on patent protection and the
perceived link between patent protection and high priced
pharmaceuticals. First, innovation comes with a hefty price. As noted
previously, the average cost to bring a drug to market, including
commercial costs, such as the preparation of marketing materials, is
more than $1 billion.39 Indeed, in 2005 alone, US pharmaceutical
companies spent approximately $51.3 billion on research and

33. PhRMA, Medicines in Development for Cancer (2008), http://www.phrma.org/files/
medsindev/Cancer2008.pdf(last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
34. PhRMA, Medicines in Development for Heart Disease and Stroke (2007),
http://www.phrma.org/files/Heart/ 0202007.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
35. PhRMA, Medicines in Development for HIVIAIDS (2007) http'J/www.phrma.org/
files/Meds%20in%20Development%2for*/o2OHIV%2OAIDS.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
36.

SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 6, at 167-73.

37. Id.
38. Mark McClellan M.D., Ph.D., Speech Before Drug Information Association (Nov. 18,
2003).
39. Peter Landers, Cost ofDeveloping a DrugIncreases to About $1.7 Billion, WALL ST. J. at
B4 (December 8, 2003).
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development. 40 Second, much of the investment occurs up-front and,
41
since only 1 out of every 5,000 to 10,000 targets makes it to market,
the development process is incredibly risky. Third, given the enormous
up-front investment, drug targets are generally patented early in the
development process and lose an appreciable amount of the period of
patent exclusivity. As it takes approximately 10 to 15 years to move a
drug candidate through discovery and development, 42 most drugs are left
with only 5 to 10 years of exclusivity which is far below the patent life
inventors enjoy in other industries. 43 The result is that once a brandname drug actually makes it to market, the pharmaceutical company
must charge a price commensurate with its upfront investment and risk
in order to recoup its costs and invest in future innovation.
B.

The SocietalNeedfor Access to More GenericDrugs

Given these unique issues, erosion of strong patent rights would
undoubtedly immobilize pharmaceutical innovation. Despite this, critics
of the pharmaceutical industry have blamed the current patent system for
the high price of prescription drugs and pushed for regulations that
facilitate entry into the market of generic alternatives. 44 Such critics'
arguments are not without merit. To the contrary, arguments in favor of
the need for more generic alternatives are incontrovertibly valid - especially considering the current healthcare crisis and aging babyboomer population.
From individuals to corporations, to the Federal Government, the
cost of prescription drugs is burdensome. Thus, faster access to more
generic alternatives is the logical solution because "generics save
consumers-and third-party payers-money." 45 A lot of money; in fact,
a recent report indicates that "if consumers were to buy generic products
whenever possible and no brand-name equivalents, [the] savings [would]

40.
41.
42.
43.

Burrill & Company, Analysis for PhRMA, PharmaceuticalIndustry Profile 2 (2006).
Accenture Report, supranote 5, at 12.
Id. at 8.
Phillips, supra note 7, at 406; Meir Statman, The Effect of Patent Expiration on the

Market Positionof Drugs, DRUGS AND HEALTH: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLICY OBJECTIVES 140

(

R.B. Helms ed., Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research ) (1980); Martin Eisman & William
Wardell, The Decline in Effective PatentLife ofNew Drugs,RESEARCH MANAGEMENT 18 (1981).
44. Alan M. Fisch, Licensing of PharmaceuticalPatents: An UnreasonableSolution to an
UnfortunateProblem,34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 296 (1994).
45. Robin J. Strongin, Hatch-Waxman, Generics, and Patents: Balancing Prescription Drug
Innovation, Competition, and Affordability, National Health Policy Forum (June 21, 2002),
http://www.nhpf.org/library/background-papers/BP._HatchWaxman_6-02.pdf.
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be approximately $17 billion" per year.46 Savings on the corporate level
are substantial as well. In December 2000, General Motors determined
that "for each one percent4 7increase in the use of generic drugs, GM can
save $3 million per year.

Based on these considerable benefits, it would seemingly make
sense to provide consumers as many generic alternatives as possible.
From a cost perspective, generic drugs unequivocally benefit society and
would be an ideal solution to a critical healthcare problem.
Unfortunately, the solution is not as simple as it appears. To fully
appreciate the implications of generic drugs, one must view the issue in
light of the trade-off between short-term and long-term benefits. In the
short-term, consumers, corporations, and the government would benefit
from greater access to less expensive prescription drugs. While billions
of dollars would be saved, the key question is at what long-term cost?
The answer is at the cost of reducing the profits of innovator
pharmaceutical companies below the level necessary to induce
investment in future research and development.
Loss of future innovation is a critical issue in any industry.
However, it is of particular concern in the pharmaceutical industry
because the vast majority of drug research and development costs in the
United States are shouldered by brand-name pharmaceutical
companies.48 For example, in 2005, pharmaceutical companies spent
78% more on drug discovery than the NIH. 49 Not surprisingly,
pharmaceutical companies are thus the source of the majority of drugs
approved by the FDA. The statistics are staggering. Between 1981 and
1990, the pharmaceutical industry developed 92.4% of approved drugs
while the government and academia were responsible for a mere 4.6%.50
Certainly, these statistics validate the fact that, but for pharmaceutical
companies' substantial investment in research and development,
innovation in the drug market would be minimal and our culture of
modem healthcare would be at risk. Moreover, any short-term cost
savings garnered from more generic drugs would undoubtedly be
obviated in the long-term by the need for incalculable government
investment in drug discovery. Put simply, the enormous short-term

46. Robert Pear, Administration Offers a Mixed View on Drug Imports, New York Times,
Oct. 22, 2004, at A28.
47. Strongin, supra note 44, at 8.
48. Phillips, supra note 7, at 407.
49. Joseph LoscaLzo, M.D., Ph.D., The NIH Budget and the Future of Biomedical Research,
354 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1665, (2006).
50. Phillips, supra note 7, at 407.
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savings reaped from more generic drugs comes at a steep price and one
we surely cannot afford.
III. THE HATCH-WAXMAN FRAMEWORK
The debate over generic drugs and the inherent benefits and risks
associated therewith has been a key policy issue for more than twenty
years. The issue was formally addressed in 1984, upon enactment of
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
commonly known as the "Hatch-Waxman Act."5 ' With the noble goal
of balancing the creation of incentives for research and development on
the part of prospective patent holders with the consumer welfareenhancing effects of the availability of52generic substitutes, the Act paved
the way for the generic drug industry.
A.

Generic Entry Barriersand the Hatch-Waxman Solution

Prior to enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic
manufacturers were faced with two main entry barriers. First, generic
manufactures were required to adhere to the same FDA approval process
as brand-name manufacturers and had to file a New Drug Application
(NDA) if they wished to market a generic equivalent of a brand-name
drug already on the market. This process required the generic
manufacturer to conduct a costly and comprehensive series of preclinical tests to determine the efficacy and safety of the drug.5 3
Essentially, the generic manufacturer had to repeat the same studies
already conducted by the brand-name manufacturer. Second, if the
generic manufacturer began such testing before the patents on the brandname drug expired, it would be committing an act of patent
infringement. Certainly, the cost to file an NDA and the delayed market
entry prevented any meaningful participation by generic manufacturers.
The Hatch-Waxman Act eliminated both entry barriers and
facilitated a robust market for generic drugs. Indeed, between 1984 and
mid-2007, the use of generic drugs increased from 19% of all
prescriptions to 67%. 54 Through creation of the Abbreviated New Drug

51. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
52. Remarks of Congressman Henry A. Waxman, Generic Pharmaceutical Association (Feb.
25, 2005), available at http://waxman.house.gov/UploadedFites/pharma.pdf (last visited, Dec. 17,
2009).
53. See, e.g., aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230-31 (4th Cir. 2002).
54. PhRMA tabulation of 1984-2000 data: IMS Health, National Prescription Audit Plus TM,
2001; 2001-2007 data: IMS Data (through 2nd Quarter of 2007).
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Application (ANDA), the Act hastened approval of generic drugs
through a streamlined and less costly process. Under this process, so
long as the generic drug is bioequivalent to its brand-name counterpart,"
the ANDA allows the generic manufacturer to rely upon the preclinical
testing results submitted for the brand-name drug. 56 Also, the FDA may
now approve the generic drug for marketing prior to expiration of the
brand-name drug's patents if the generic manufacturer makes one of four
certifications.57 Three certifications - - paragraph I, paragraph II, and
paragraph III certifications - - apply to ANDA filings that do not
challenge the patents still protecting the brand-name drug. The fourth,
called a "paragraph IV certification," is of particular importance to the
issues discussed herein because it allows a generic manufacturer to claim
that the patents protecting the brand-name drug are either invalid or not
infringed.58
Although the Act provides considerable benefits to generic
59
manufacturers, it does not render patent owners entirely defenseless.
Upon learning of a paragraph IV certification, the patent owner has
forty-five days in which to sue the generic manufacturer for patent
infringement.6 ° If suit is brought within this timeframe, an automatic
thirty-month stay is triggered, during which time the FDA may not
approve the generic drug. 61 As a result, a paragraph IV certification
almost always leads to a lawsuit. To prevent this risk from deterring
generic entry, the Act awards the first filer of a paragraph IV
certification a 180-day period of exclusivity, during which other generic
manufacturers are barred from marketing their version of the brandname drug.6 2
B.

The Resultant Culture of Litigation

Ultimately, because there is a massive asymmetry in the ratio of
risk to reward available to brand-name and generic manufacturers
respectively, this statutory framework creates an environment of
litigation.

55. 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2000).
56. Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
57.

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(1)-(III) (2000).

58. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000).
59. The patent owner is assumed to be the brand-name manufacturer.
60. 35 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000).
61.

Id.

62. 35 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000).
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Unlike in a typical patent infringement suit where an alleged
infringer enters the market after substantial investment in manufacturing
and marketing, under the Hatch-Waxman framework, the patent holder
is incentivized to bring suit before the alleged infringer has invested
anything other than legal fees.63 Also, because of the timing of the
lawsuit, the alleged infringer escapes liability for damages. 64 The
potential benefits, in contrast, are enormous. For example, after
successfully challenging Eli Lilly's Prozac patents, Barr Laboratories,
during the 180-day exclusivity period, sold $311 million of its generic
equivalent and produced earnings that were nearly $3.00 per share
higher than in the previous fiscal year.65
In stark contrast, the risks to the patent holder are vast and the
benefits few. If the patent holder loses the infringement suit, "it will be
stripped of its patent monopoly., 66 Indeed, collateral estoppel is of great
concern to the patent holder because once a patent is invalidated, nonmutual issue preclusion prevents the patentee from ever asserting it
again. Moreover, the patentee stands to gain little from winning the
suit other than continuation of the lawful monopoly over the
manufacture and sale of the drug. 68 Even worse, because the HatchWaxman framework forces a premature patent infringement suit, the
patent holder is denied any possibility for damages. Considering that the
patent holder likely invested 10 to 15 years of research and development
and more than $1 billion to develop and market the drug69 this result
seems particularly inequitable.
Accordingly, the Act "creates a legal environment conducive to
horizontal agreement and strategic interaction between incumbent,
brand-name drug manufacturers, on the one hand, and potential
competitors seeking to file ANDAs, on the other., 70 Brand-name
manufacturers, in an attempt to protect their patent rights, have been
forced to employ strategies within the complex web of laws to deter
entry by generic manufacturers. 71 The result has been the emergence of
exclusionary tactics such as reverse exclusionary agreements, authorized

63. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 206.
64. Id.
65. A. Maureen Rouchi, Beyond Hatch-Waxman, Chemical & Engineering News (Sept. 23,
2002) http://pubs.acs.org/cen/coverstory/8038/8038biogenerics2.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
66. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 207.
67. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of 111.Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
68. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 207.
69. Landers, supra note 38.
70. Devlin, supra note 11, at 639.
71.

Id. at 640.
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72

generics, and product hopping. While reverse exclusionary agreements
and authorized generics are of particular concern in the pharmaceutical
industry, the scope of this Comment will address only product
hopping.7 3
C. ProductHopping as an Exclusionary Tactic
Product hopping occurs when a patentee switches the formulation
of its patented drug as soon as a generic competitor's ANDA is
approved. 74 The Hatch-Waxman Act coupled with the FDA's regulatory
framework creates an ideal environment for this tactic because
substitution of a generic for the brand-name drug is permitted only if the
generic has been "AB-rated" by the FDA. 75 To be AB-rated, the generic
drug must not only be bioequivalent to the brand-name drug, but also
have the same form, dosage, and strength.76 Thus, "an approved generic
that is not AB-rated against a currently available branded drug . . .
cannot be substituted for the branded drug and may only be sold, if at all,
as a separately branded, rather than generic drug."77
Given this requirement, a brand-name manufacturer could
effectively foreclose a generic competitor from entering the market by
switching the formulation, dosage, or strength of its patented drug as
soon as the generic competitor's ANDA is approved.78 The timing of
the product hop is critical and determines whether the antitrust laws are
implicated.7 9 Specifically, if the brand-name manufacturer "product
hops after an ANDA is filed by the generic manufacturer, but before the
accuracy of the paragraph IV certification has been judicially
determined, the FDA will be unable to grant authorization., 80 The
generic manufacturer is thus faced with two options: 1) enter the
relevant market as a brand-name drug; or 2) restart the ANDA process
based on the new version of the brand-name drug. 1 Certainly, these

72. Id. at 632 (The first manifestation of this practice has seen incumbents and potential

entrants entering into so-called reverse exclusionary agreements. Subsequent practices involve such
strategies as product hopping and authorized generics.).

73. For a detailed description of the antitrust issues related to reverse exclusionary agreements
and authorized generics. See Devlin, supranote I I at 640-57 and 674-80.
74. Devlin, supranote 11, at 657
75. Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 415 (D. Del. 2006).
76. ld. at 415.
77. Id.
78. Devlin, supra note 11, at 657.
79.

Id. at 658.

80. Id.
81. Id.
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The first would be prohibitively
options provide no resolution.
expensive as the generic competitor would be required to file an NDA
and conduct extensive preclinical testing. The second, while feasible,
could result in a vicious cycle because, assuming the USPTO will grant
an improvement patent, the brand-name manufacturer could reformulate
its patented drug each time an entrant filed an ANDA. 8 2 Regardless of
the option pursued by the generic manufacturer, § 2 of the Sherman Act
is implicated because the brand-name manufacturer perpetuates its
monopoly, 83 which ultimately harms consumers by simultaneously
reducing consumer choice and increasing price.
IV. THE PITFALLS AND PROMISES OF ANTITRUST DECISION THEORY

The pertinent question is thus: how should courts address product
hopping under the antitrust laws. There are three possible modes of
analysis: 1) per se illegal; 2) rule of reason; and 3) per se legal. This
author argues that a per se legal approach should be applied so long as
the product hop is supported by a valid patent. At the other end of the
spectrum is the per se illegal approach which is easily eliminated
because a business practice may be condemned under this approach only
if the challenged action has a "pernicious effect on competition and
lack[s] any redeeming value. ' '8 4 Applying such an approach to product
hopping would induce consumer harm because product hops based upon
valid improvements would be condemned and foreclose potentially
valuable new drugs from the market. The rule of reason approach falls
somewhere in the middle. Under this approach, which has been applied
in recent cases and advocated by at least one antitrust scholar, "a court
will conduct a case-specific assessment of the facts to determine whether
the relevant actions actually harmed consumers or not., 85 Examination
of two recent cases brings to light the promises and pitfalls of the rule of
reason versus per se legal approach.

82. Id. at 657.
83. Id. at 660.
84. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
289
(1985).
85. Devlin, supra note 11, at 634; see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911) (applying the rule of reason standard for the first time).
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A.

Recent ProductHopping Cases
1. Walgreen Co. et al. v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals- The Case
of Prilosec and Nexium

Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca 6 involved the well-known heartburn
drugs Prilosec and Nexium. The crux of plaintiffs' claim was that
AstraZeneca engaged in anticompetitive innovation in violation of § 2 of
the Sherman Act by deliberately switching the market from Prilosec,
which had generic competition, to a virtually identical drug, Nexium,
The active ingredient in
which did not have generic competition.
Nexium is an isomer of the active ingredient in Prilosec88 , meaning that
the molecules that have the same molecular formula but different
structural properties.89 Put simply, the drugs are similar but have distinct
effects on the body. 90 The plaintiffs asserted there was no
pharmacodynamic reason the two drugs would interact with the body
any differently and that by vigorously promoting Nexium over Priolsec,
AstraZeneca undermined the market for Prilosec's generic alternatives.9 1
In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that AstraZeneca "engaged in
prohibited exclusionary conduct when it introduced [an over the counter
version of] Prilosec
and obtained a grant of exclusivity for three years
92
from the FDA.

Ultimately, the court held that AstraZeneca did not violate § 2
because the "fact that a new product siphoned off some of the sales from
the old product, and, in turn, depressed sales of the generic substitutes
93
for the old product does not create an antitrust cause of action.,
AstraZeneca did not interfere with the plaintiffs' right to compete
because Prilosec was left on the market. The court concluded
AstraZeneca's conduct was pro-competitive because they successfully
advertised a new product, albeit to the disadvantage of plaintiffs.94

86. Walgreen Co., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 148-49 (D.D.C. 2008).
87. Id. at 149.
88. Gilbert, supra note 9, at 69.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Walgreen Co., 534 F. Supp. 2d at 149.
Id.
Id. at 152.
Id.
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2. Abbott Laboratories v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. - The
TriCor Case
Abbott v. Teva 95 presents a similar series of facts; however, Abbott
96
recently denied wrongdoing and settled the case for $184 million.
Abbott, the manufacturer of TriCor, a fenofibrate drug used to treat high
levels of triglycerides and high cholesterol, allegedly engaged in
prohibited exclusionary conduct under § 2 of the Sherman Act when it
changed the drug from a capsule to a patented, lower dosage tablet with
a broader FDA indication that included the ability to increase good
cholesterol levels.97 Then, on a second occasion, Abbott, again based on
a patent, offered a different, even lower dosage tablet based on a new
composition of the active ingredient that could be absorbed into the
bloodstream without being taken with food. 98 Unlike in Walgreen Co. v.
AstraZeneca 99 where AstraZeneca left the old formulation on the market,
here, Abbott pulled the previous formulations off the market.'l° In both
cases, Abbott also notified the National Drug Data File (NDDF), a
private database that provides information about FDA approved drugs,
that the previous formulations were obsolete, thus preventing
pharmacies from filling prescriptions for TriCor with a generic
alternative.' 0 ' Generic manufacturers alleged that Abbott intentionally
manipulated the Hatch-Waxman framework to monopolize the
fenofibrate market by preventing pharmacies from filling prescriptions
written for the new TriCor formulations with generic alternatives.' 0 2
B.

The TradeoffBetween Innovation andAntitrust

While there are several key issues in these cases, this Comment will
focus mainly on the critical question of how much innovation is enough
to prevent an antitrust violation. Addressing this question in the context
of the pharmaceutical industry presents much complexity because
"incremental... innovation in the form of supplementary approvals for
new dosages, formulations, and indications account for a substantial

95. Abbott, 432 F.Supp.2d 408 (D. Del. 2006).
96. See Tracy Staton, Abbott to Pay $184 Million in TriCor Settlement (Nov. 11, 2008)
http://www.fiercepharma.com/storyabbott-pay-184m-tricor-settlement/2008-11-21 (last visited
Dec. 17,2008).
97. Abbott, 432 F.Supp.2d at 416.
98. Id. at 418.
99. Walgreen Co., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146.
100. Abbott, 432 F.Supp.2d at 416, 418.
101. Id.at 416.
102. Id. at 418-19.
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share of drug utilization and associated economic and medical
benefits."' 0 3 Adopting a rule that would condemn such incremental
innovation would be disastrous. Moreover, because "a monopolist is
permitted, and indeed encouraged, by § 2 to compete aggressively on the
merits, any success that it may achieve through 'the process of
innovation' is clearly tolerated by the antitrust laws."'1 4 Thus, a per se
legal rule against liability under the Sherman Act should be adopted
when a product hop is supported by a valid patent.
The beauty of the per se legal approach is its simplicity. Rather
than waste precious judicial resources and hefty discovery and litigation
expenditures, as is necessary in applying the rule of reason, under this
simplified test, a judge, upon deeming a product hop is based on a valid
patent, would simply dismiss the matter. Predictability and simplicity
would be greatly enhanced, type I errors avoided, and the Patent Act
respected. For example, under the proposed per se legal approach,
Abbott v. Teva' 0 5 and Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca' 0 6 would have the
same outcome. In both cases, patents supported the product hops. Thus,
the conduct of both companies would be deemed per se legal.
1. The Rule of Reason's Overly Complex Formula
Opponents to this outcome, including the plaintiffs in Walgreen Co.
v. AstraZeneca' 0 7 and Abbott v. Teva,'0 8 argue in favor of the rule of
reason because some product improvements are "strategic business
decisions, intended to avoid competition on the merits, and thereby to
protect an existing market position against otherwise foreseeable
decline."' 0 9 While in some cases their argument may hold true,
approaching the issue of pharmaceutical product hopping under the rule
of reason is simply too complex.
Under the rule of reason, a court, in addressing the question of how
much innovation is enough to prevent antitrust violation, will conduct "a
case-specific assessment of the facts to determine whether the relevant
103. Ernst R. Bemdt, etal., The Impact of Incremental Innovation on Biopharmaceuticals:
Drug Utilization in Original and Supplemental Indications, 24 Suppl. 2 PHARMACOECONOMICS,
69-86 (2006).
104. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,281 (2d Cir. 1979).
105. Abbott, 432 F.Supp.2d 408 (D. Del. 2006).
106. Walgreen Co., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146.
107. Id.
108. Abbott, 432 F.Supp.2d 408 (D. Del. 2006).
109. Jay L. Himes & Saami Zain, Anti-Competitive Innovation:Is There a Role for Antitrust in
Evaluating Product Line Extensions, American Conference Institute: Pharmaceutical Antitrust 14
(May 2007).
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actions actually harmed consumers or not.""
According to the
Supreme Court, the rule of reason inquiry is "whether the challenged
[conduct] is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses
competition ......
1,1 While a seemingly simple test on its face,
application of the test is plagued with difficulties when coupled with the
issues of pharmaceutical patents. Specifically, "a total [rule of reason]
test would have to consider the impacts of innovation on the innovator
and on other firms and consumers in the present and in the future, and
should also account for the impacts of antitrust enforcement on future
incentives to innovate." ' 1 2 Whether courts are in a position to conduct
this complex analysis is clearly debatable.
Indeed, even economists faced with this question would likely be
unable to render a synchronous decision about consumer welfare. 1 3 The
rule of reason formula is simply too open-ended because "when
everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive."' 114 For example, a court
addressing the questions posed in the Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca" 5
and Abbott v. Teva"16 cases would have to grapple with the fact that in
both cases, the brand-name drug company was granted patents on
improvements to its drugs and thus granted a permissible, short-term
monopoly for their manufacture, use, and sale.17 Since "even a
monopolist, may, 'through technological innovation expand its market
share, increase consumer brand identification, or create demand for new
products" ' 118 , determining whether such incremental innovation is too
minimal to avoid antitrust violation is nearly impossible.
By
invalidating the patents, a court would benefit consumers and other firms
in the short-term, but could stifle future innovation. The problem is that
the impact on future innovation is impossible to measure. Certainly, if
economists would be unable to agree upon the economic outcome, how
can we expect courts to do so?

110. Devlin, supra note 11, at 634 (referring to Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I
(1911) (applying the rule of reason standard for the first time).
111. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
112. Gilbert, supra note 9, at 53.
113. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 11 (1984).
114. Id. at 12.
115. Walgreen Co., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146.
116. Abbott, 432 F.Supp.2d 408 (D. Del. 2006).
117. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1); See generally, Michael C. Smith, Patent Litigation:A Changing
Landscape,71 TEx. B.J. 42 (2008).
118. Abbott, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 420 (quoting Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
703 F.2d 534, 546 (9th Cir. 1983))).
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2. A More Structured Rule of Reason Imposes Too Great a
Burden on Patent Holders and Overshadows the Presumption of
Patent Validity
One antitrust scholar advocates for application of a slightly
modified rule of reason and argues that so long as the incumbent
pharmaceutical company is prevented from withdrawing its original
product from the market for a limited period of time, we should rely on
the "court's ability to distinguish non-existent or trivial
improvements.., from significant quality enhancements." '"19 This
approach is well supported because it makes at least one factor
dispositive and seemingly solves the issues of consumer harm and harm
to innovation. Specifically, by keeping its old product on the market, the
incumbent manufacturer allows generic market entry and thus greater
competition and consumer choice. 20 In addition, the incumbent would
still be able to market its new product and potentially reap the benefits of
2
its research and development efforts and upfront investment.1 '
Although convincing, this argument relies on the province of the courts
to distinguish between trivial improvements and significant quality
enhancements. This is troublesome because just as courts are ill
equipped to handle complex economic analyses, 122 so too are they ill
into whether a product
equipped to handle complex analyses
123
improvement is trivial or significant.
Even more concerning is that this approach overshadows the rule
that every patent enjoys a presumption of validity. 24 By questioning
patent validity, the rule of reason threatens future innovation by clouding
the value of the intellectual property rights on which pharmaceutical

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Devlin, supra note 1 ,at 662.
Id. at661.
Id.
See Easterbrook, supra note 107, at 12.
Similar difficulties exist in other contexts.

For example, the 9th Circuit's subjective

motivation test from Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F. 3d 1195, 1201 (9th

Cir. 1997), was criticized by the Federal Circuit. See In re Independent Service Orgs. Antitrust
Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed.Cir. 2000) ("We see no more reason to inquire into the
subjective motivation of Xerox in refusing to sell or license its patented works than we found in
evaluating the subjective motivation of the patentee in bringing suit to enforce that same right. In
the absence of any illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the
patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, using or selling the
claimed invention free from liability under the antitrust laws. We therefore will not inquire into his
subjective motivation for exerting his statutory rights, even though his refusal to sell or license his
patent invention may have an anti-competitive effect, so long as that anti-competitive effect is not
illegally extended beyond the statutory patent grant.").
124. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
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companies have traditionally relied. This should be avoided and,
instead, courts should apply simple presumptions that "structure antitrust
inquiry" and, thus, "guide businesses in planning their affairs by making
it possible for counsel to state that some things do not create risks of
liability.' 25 In the case of product hopping, one such presumption
should be that any product hop based on a patent is per se legal. Since
every patent issued by the USPTO already carries a presumption of
validity 126 justified by the "complexities of patent law and the expertise
of the patent office"' 2 7 , this additional presumption is merely a natural
extension.
3. Arguments Against the Presumption of Validity are
Outweighed By the Benefits of Future Pharmaceutical
Innovation
Despite the benefits of the presumption of validity, Doug Lichtman
and Mark Lemley posit that the presumption should be weakened
because the large number of patent applications, limited financial
resources, and incomplete information make it impossible for the
USPTO to thoroughly review applications and grant only those patents
deserving of protection. 128 Their argument has merit as a high
percentage of patents are invalidated during litigation 129; however, it
fails to acknowledge the unique intricacies of drug discovery such as the
enormous upfront investment in research and development, early
patenting of thousands of drug targets, and the high failure rate of
testing.
As discussed previously, because of this dimension of
complexity, patent rights are critical to innovator pharmaceutical
companies and even minimal weakening the presumption of validity will
lead to increased uncertainty surrounding a pharmaceutical company's
ability to enforce its patents. Ultimately, societal harm will result as
firms will decrease investment in innovation.
Lichtman and Lemley disagree and note that less certainty is
unlikely to radically alter behavior because "success in the
pharmaceutical industry ...depends on other unavoidable uncertainties
such as the uncertainty associated with FDA review and the... risk that,

125. Easterbrook, supra note 107, at 14.
126. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
127. Monroe Auto Equipment Co. v. Heckethorne Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 412 (6th
Cir.).
128. Id. at 413.
129. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents,26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 200 (1998).
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because of some unexpected side effect, a blockbuster drug will
suddenly lose all of its value."' 3 ° While such uncertainties are indeed
unavoidable, their argument ignores the fact that the presumption of
validity is a critical constant that allows pharmaceutical companies to
withstand the risks posed by the FDA approval process and the ever
looming possibility of adverse side effects. If companies were no longer
assured their investment in new drug targets would be protected by a
presumption of validity, the cumulative risks would simply be too great
to bear. While the current USPTO patent review process and
presumption of validity are far from perfect, they provide critical
stability for the pharmaceutical industry which, in turn, fuels continued
Overall, the benefits of the presumption of validity
innovation.
outweigh the harms and further confirm the need to apply a per se legal
approach to product hopping.
4. A Per Se Legal Approach Defers to the USPTO and Facilitates
Consistent Outcomes
Indeed, given the great complexity of pharmaceutical patents, it is
reasonable to assume that understanding a pharmaceutical patent itself,
much less whether it represents a significant improvement over the
previous version of the drug, requires an understanding of the relevant
chemical sciences. For example, Abbott's '670 patent, at issue in Abbott
v. Teva, 131 claims "an immediate-release fenofibrate composition
comprising: (a) an inert hydrosoluble carrier covered with at least one
layer containing fenofibrate in a micronized form having a size less than
20 <<mu>>m,a hydrophilic polymer and a surfactant .... ,,A32 The
extreme technical content of this claim and others at issue in
pharmaceutical product hopping cases, suggests that courts should defer
to the USPTO's experienced examiners as they have the technical
background to properly make such determinations whereas judges and
juries may not. The bottom line is that the USPTO, rather than the
courts, should decide whether a product improvement is enough to
warrant the limited monopoly granted by a patent. This is easily
accomplished under a per se legal approach.
Whether deference to the USPTO's technical savvy is justified is
hotly debated. Lichtman and Lemley argue that although patent
examiners have expertise in the relevant subject areas while judges and
130. Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 20, at 58.
131. Abbott, 432 F.Supp.2d 408 (D. Del. 2006).
132. U.S. Patent No. 6,074,670 (filed Jan. 9, 1998).
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juries do not, the USPTO functions under such poor conditions that any
advantages associated with expertise are overwhelmed by the
disadvantages associated with insufficient funding and inadequate
outsider information.1 33 They argue a court-based review process is
superior because more complete information results from the adversarial
process and financial constraints are reduced because only a tiny fraction
of issued patents warrant litigation.1 34 While this argument correctly
acknowledges the many challenges faced by the USPTO, Lichtman and
Lemley again fail to fully appreciate the complexity of the drug
discovery process and the challenges faced by innovator pharmaceutical
companies. By failing to respect the decisions of the USPTO, patent
rights are diminished. This leads to increased uncertainty and decreased
innovation. Consequently, disadvantages that arise from deference to
the USPTO are offset by the societal need for continual advances in
pharmaceutical innovation.
Although the USPTO's review process may be imperfect, deference
to the USPTO fosters consistency. Consistent decisions confirm the
certainty of patent rights which, in turn, facilitate not only investment in
innovation, but also decreased litigation costs. As discussed supra, the
rule of reason requires an incredibly complex undertaking that courts are
ill equipped to perform. In contrast to the predictable per se legal
approach, the rule of reason is open-ended and yields contradictory
results. The problem with the rule of reason is that "any one factor
might or might not outweigh another, or all of the others.' 3 5 Such
vagueness proffers no guidance to businesses planning their conduct
1' 36
and, in the context of litigation, leads to "ceaseless discovery."
Indeed, "litigation costs are the product of vague rules combined with
high stakes, and nowhere is that combination more deadly than in
antitrust litigation under the Rule of Reason."' 37 Adding the question of
how much innovation is enough in the context of pharmaceutical product
hopping makes the combination even more lethal. The stakes are
enormous because on the one hand, brand-name pharmaceutical
companies' patent rights and incentive to innovate are at risk, and on the
other, consumer choice, decreased cost, and increased competition. The
problem is that "in antitrust, there is no right answer"' 38 and, thus,

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 20, at 47.
Id.
Easterbrook, supra note 107, at 12.
Id.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss2/6

22

Ethier: Permissible Product Hopping
2009]

PERMISSIBLE PRODUCT HOPPING

ex ante and optimal
balancing the trade-off between "optimal incentives
39
fail.1
to
doomed
is
knowledge"
existing
of
use
5. Adoption of a Per Se Legal Approach will Prevent Type I
Errors
Failure to properly balance ex ante incentives with the optimal use
of existing knowledge will undoubtedly lead to type I errors. Type I
errors, which occur when pro-competitive business practices are struck
down 140 , are particularly egregious because "a practice once condemned
is likely to stay condemned, no matter its benefits"' 4 1. Thus, if
pharmaceutical innovation is condemned it is likely to stay condemned.
Application of a per se legal approach when the product hop is supported
by a patent avoids type I errors by deferring to the USPTO and
respecting pharmaceutical companies' patent rights. If such a test is
,142
adopted, although some "socially undesirable practices may escape" 4 ,
the risk of type I errors is minimal. To the contrary, under the rule of
reason, the risk of type I errors is great because, as discussed above, the
complexity of the test will lead to ineffective balancing of short-term
consider the
and long-term benefits. To put this risk in perspective,
43
Teva.1
v.
Abbott
of
outcome
hypothetical
following
If Abbott had not settled and its conduct was deemed exclusionary
in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, Abbott and other pharmaceutical
companies would undoubtedly alter their future conduct to avoid similar
liability. Specifically, they would likely be overly cautious with respect
to releasing products based on incremental innovation. This is troubling
because incremental innovation can be pro-competitive as it brings new
drugs to market and benefits consumers by providing treatments for a
For example, in Walgreen Co. v.
greater array of diseases.
44 there was some indication Nexium was useful for the
AstraZeneca,'
treatment of esophageal and duodenal ulcers. 145 Similarly, in Abbott v.
Teva, Abbott claimed the new TriCor formulations offered a lower
dosage, the potential benefit for increasing good cholesterol, and the

139. Id.
140. Devlin, supra note 11, 641 n.55 (referencing Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach
to the Law ofEvidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1504 (1999) (defining Type I and Type II errors)).
141. Easterbrook, supra note 107, at 15.
142. Id.
143. Abbott, 432 F.Supp.2d 408 (D. Del. 2006).
144. Walgreen Co., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146.
145. Gilbert, supra note 9, at 69.
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ability to be taken without food. 146 Because of the presence of valid
patents on the Nexium and TriCor formulations, under the per se legal
rule, it would be unnecessary to address whether or not these differences
constitute improvements. The product hops would simply be deemed
legal and incentives to innovate would be preserved. The same outcome
would result for Nexium under the rule of reason because, since the old
formulation was left on the market, it would be considered per se legal.
Tricor is a different story. Since the previous TriCor formulations were
pulled off the market, a court would have to assess whether the new
formulation is a significant improvement over the previous. Here, one
could argue that TriCor's lower dosage means less medication for the
liver to process and an easier, more convenient pill to swallow. While
this may be a strong argument, some courts would likely reject it, deem
TriCor per se illegal, and remove it from the market. Others might
accept the criteria as sufficient and leave TriCor on the market.
Supposing that TriCor indeed benefits at least some consumers,
condemning it under the rule of reason would constitute a type I error
and thus disincentivize investment in future innovation for fear similar
products would be deemed illegal products hops.
Unlike the rule of reason, the per se legal rule eliminates the risk of
type I errors. Although, this approach may permit some socially
undesirable practices, such as decreased generic competition in the
short-term, "errors on the side of excusing questionable practices are
preferable" because "the economic system corrects monopoly more
readily than it corrects judicial errors. 147 In addition, the "costs of
monopoly wrongly permitted are small, while the costs of competition
wrongly condemned are large."' 48
6. Benefits of the Per Se Legal Approach Outweigh the Risks
Posed by Type II Errors
Type II errors are also of concern in the context of product hopping.
In contrast to type I, such errors constitute false positives and occur
when patents are issued for compounds undeserving of patent protection.
Under the per se legal approach, type II errors would undoubtedly exist
because imperfections in the USPTO's review process, such as resource
constraints, imperfect information, and the challenges of prior art

146. Abbot, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 416.
147. Easterbrook, supra note 107, at 15.
148. Id.
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searches lead to an increased incidence of type II errors. 4 9 Despite this,
the consequences of type I errors are far more troublesome because they
disincentivize incremental innovation while type II errors do not.
Rather, allowing some undeserved patent rights, while potentially
harmful to consumers in the short-term due to decreased generic
competition and increased price, ultimately benefit consumers in the
long-term by ensuring continued investment in innovation. While type
II errors may be reduced by tightening the requirements of patentability,
this strategy fails miserably in the context of pharmaceutical patents
because, as discussed infra, incremental innovation is prominent in drug
discovery and stricter patentability requirements foreclose future
innovation.
Certainly, there is no perfect solution. Indeed, shifting deference
away from the USPTO to the courts, as suggested by Lichtman and
Lemley, is similarly riddled with type II errors. Specifically, the clear
and convincing standard required to overcome the presumption of
validity is stringent and favors patentability.15 0 Also, jury trials favor
patentability because jurors tend to favor inventors over infringers and
are often swayed toward patentability by the technological "wowThe bottom line is when courts cannot reliably make
factor". 5
determinations, a bright-line rule, such as the per se legal approach, will
serve as the best heuristic.
7. A Per Se Legal Approach Respects the Current Legislative and
Regulatory Framework and Fosters Incremental Pharmaceutical
Innovation
The benefits of the per se legal approach to product hopping are
clear. However, it is important to acknowledge the counterargument that
the standard for granting improvement patents is too low' 5 2 and allows
pharmaceutical companies to improperly manipulate the Hatch-Waxman
framework to their advantage. While such arguments are not without
merit, the USPTO, in granting improvement patents, is simply applying
the statutory framework promulgated by Congress. Under the current
Patent Act, an applicant is entitled to an improvement patent if that

149. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Non-Obviousness: A Comment on Three Learned Papers, 12
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 431, 434 (2008).
150. Id. at 434.
151. Id.at434-35.
152. See Devlin, supra note 11, at 660.
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product is different from the original. 5 3 Enhancement in product quality
is not required. Despite this low threshold, the Patent Act prevents
illusory product improvements because "one year after approval of the
underlying patent, the 'parent' becomes part of the prior art."' 5 4 Thus,
"mere reformulation is likely to founder on the novelty requirement.' ' 55
Moreover, due to the nature of drug discovery, the low threshold of
patentability is critical to pharmaceutical patent rights because most
pharmaceutical research and development is incremental. Opponents
argue that incremental innovation provides little or no advantage, and
therefore does not deserve patent protection. However, this position is
misguided and demonstrates a lack of understanding of drug discovery
key to most major advances in the
because incremental innovation is the
156
treatment and prevention of disease.
For this reason, there is a strong need for continued patent
protection of drug compounds that are merely different, not necessarily
an improvement, over their predecessors. This is the mainstay of
incremental innovation because minor variations on previously known
compounds may have surprising properties. However, given that drug
compounds are necessarily patented early in the development process,
the benefits of such properties may not emerge until much later. Thus, a
low threshold of patentability is necessary and must focus on differences
rather than improvements because the ability of innovator
pharmaceutical companies to patent slightly different analogs of the
same compound is what makes modem drug discovery possible.
Without such protection, the considerable investment necessary to
investigate those compounds would be outweighed by the risk of the
patent being denied later in the process or competitors copying the
compound. Put simply, increasing the threshold of patentability would
halt pharmaceutical innovation as we know it.
Given the critical need to meet future healthcare requirements, this
is a risk we cannot afford to take. Courts must continue to respect the

153. See id. at 636 n.22 (The primary bar to patenting an improvement will be anticipation, but
this only occurs if a single prior art discloses each and every element of the claimed invention).
See, Roger Schechter & John Thomas, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 77 (Thomson West 2d ed.
2004). See generally, Arnold B. Silverman, The Relationship Between Basic and Improvement
Patents, 47 J. MINERALS, METALS, & MATERIALS Soc'Y 50 (1995), available at http://
www.tms.org/pubs/j ournals/JOM/matters/matters-9501.html.
154. Devlin, supranote 11, at 660.
155. Id.

156. Glaxo Smith Kline, Press Release on Incremental Innovation, Jan. 2008 at
http://www.gsk.com/policies/GSK-public-policy-on-incremental-innovation.pdf (last visited Dec.
17,2008).
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current state of the Patent Act and, thus, refrain from applying the rule of
reason to invalidate even those patents granted for incremental
innovation. While the USPTO's review process is imperfect and risks
type II errors which could reduce consumer choice and increase prices,
the long-term benefits of deferring to the USPTO and respecting the
current presumption of validity far outweigh these short-term risks.
Finally, if pharmaceutical product hopping is, at some point,
deemed an unforeseen consequence of the Patent Act's arguably low
standard for grant of improvement patents or the Hatch-Waxman Act's
30-month stay provision, surely the proper forum to address this issue is
Congress rather than the courts. Alternatively, "the FDA could develop
policies to facilitate generic substitution and limit new drug approvals to
drugs that meet a threshold level of utility.' 57 Regardless, proponents
of modification to the Patent Act or FDA regulations should err on the
side of caution because increasing the statutory requirements for grant of
improvement patents or allowing easier entry of generic drugs, much
like the rule of reason, risks stifling future innovation.
V. CONCLUSION

In sum, the issue of pharmaceutical product hopping is complex
and much is at stake for consumers and pharmaceutical companies - brand-name and generic alike. The Patent Act, in combination with the
Hatch-Waxman Act, exists to balance the delicate relationship between
incentives for future pharmaceutical innovation and the need for
additional generic alternatives. By adopting a per se legal approach
when the product hop is supported by a valid patent, courts will respect
the intricate statutory framework already in place and, at the same time,
align short-term and long-term benefits. In doing so, courts will prevent
harm to consumers and patent holders by facilitating more predictable
outcomes and preventing type I errors that could suspend further
innovation. While the USPTO's review process is imperfect and risks
type II errors, the long-term benefits of a per se legal approach far
outweigh the short-term disadvantages. The logical conclusion is that, in
the context of pharmaceutical product hopping, the rule of reason is
simply too complex and should be overlooked because by seeking "to
embody every economic complexity and qualification, [it may], through
undercutting
the vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive,
'1 58
the very economic ends [it] seeks to serve."
157. Gilbert, supranote 9, at 74.
158. Easterbrook, supra note 107, at 16.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

27

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 6

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss2/6

28

